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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78A-4-103 the Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to hear this matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Whether the trial court correctly denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress? "On review of 
criminal ... proceedings, we accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, "We review 
the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial 
court's application of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, ^{11, 139 
P.3d281. 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
UT Const. Art. 1, § 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the Fourth District of Utah, Wasatch County, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress was 
denied, and the Defendant now appeals that decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Suppression Hearing: January 23, 2008 
On August 20, 2007, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Trooper David Wurtz of the Utah 
Highway Patrol was patrolling in the area of SR 248 mile marker 6, in Wasatch County (R. 1: 4-
5). Officer Wurtz pulled over a black Jetta for speeding and subsequently arrested the driver (R. 
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1: 5-6). Before the arrest, Officer Wurtz waited for another officer to get there before he put the 
driver under arrest (R. 1:7). 
After the driver was placed under arrest, Officer Wurtz approached Mr. Hurt and asked 
him to get out of the car, and Mr. Hurt complied with Officer Wurtz's command (R. 1: 8). 
Officer Wurtz also asked Mr. Hurt to empty his pockets, and then told Mr. Hurt to open the eye 
glass case that Officer Wurtz could see in Mr. Hurt's pocket (R. 1: 8-9). Mr. Hurt opened the 
eye glass case, and Officer Wurtz did not get a good enough look, so he made Mr. Hurt open the 
eye glass case again (R. 1: 10-11). 
Officer Wurtz testified that Mr. Hurt did not show any aggression towards the officers, 
and that he did exactly what the officer told him to do (R. 1: 12). Furthermore, Mr. Hurt has no 
prior felony convictions, and in fact, the only convictions that he has is for domestic violence and 
making a false report (R. 1: 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Hurt was unlawfully detained by Officer Wurtz. While case law permits an officer to 
detain a passenger during a routine traffic stop to effectuate the purpose of the stop, case law 
only permits continued detainment if there is reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity. 
A person has been detained if a reasonable person under similar circumstances would 
believe that he or she is not free to leave. Officer Wurtz's first communication with Mr. Hurt 
happened riglit after he placed the driver under arrest, and he ordered Mr. Hurt out of the car and 
immediately began asking Mr. Hurt if he had any weapons. A reasonable person in Mr. Hurt's 
situation would not feel that he was free to leave. 
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Even if the detainment was proper, Officer Wurtz did not have reasonable articulable 
suspicion that Mr. Hurt was involved in criminal activity. Officer Wurtz did not testify to any 
facts that would give rise to a reasonable suspicion. Without a reasonable suspicion, Officer 
Wurtz cannot search Mr. Hurt. Furthermore, the officer must have an individualized suspicion 
that Mr. Hurt was armed and dangerous in order to frisk Mr. Hurt. As mentioned above, the 
officer did not testify as to any facts that would give rise to a suspicion that Mr. Hurt was armed 
and dangerous. Because there are no facts to support that Mr. Hurt was armed and dangerous, 
Officer Wurtz did not have authority to frisk Mr. Hurt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he unlawfully detained Mr, Hurt. 
An officer has the authority to detain the driver and passengers in a car during a traffic 
stop for as long as it is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. James, 2000 UT 
80, f 10, 13 P.3d 576. However, the officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that a 
crime has been or is about to be committed, and the detention must last no longer than is 
necessary. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). 
a. Officers may detain passengers during a traffic stop, but must let them go if 
there is no reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is involved. 
In a recent United States Supreme Court case, the Court held that a passenger in a private 
veliicle that is pulled over by police is seized from the moment the car comes to a halt on the side 
of the road. Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct 2400, 2410 (2007). The Court further stated that 
"any reasonable passenger would have understood ... that no one in the car was free to depart 
without police permission." Id, at 2406-07. Because there is no question as to whether the 
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defendant was detained, the question that must be answered is whether the officer had reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the detainee committed or was about to commit a crime. 
In a similar case to the one at hand, the Utah Court of Appeals has given its guidance on 
the issue. See, State v. Baker, 182 P.3d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). In Baker, the defendant was 
a passenger in a car that was pulled over for a minor traffic violation. Id. at 937. When the 
officer approached the vehicle, he noticed a knife on the lap of one of the passengers. Id The 
officer ran the driver's license and found that it had been suspended, so the officer arrested the 
driver. Id. Shortly after the arrest, an officer frisked the defendant and found drug 
paraphernalia. Id The court held that the defendant's detention following the driver's arrest was 
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must 
be excluded. Id at 939. 
The court came to this conclusion by finding that there was no reasonable suspicion that 
the defendant committed or was about to commit a crime. Id In determining that there was not 
a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed or was about to be committed, the court 
looked at the totality of the circumstances. Baker, 182 P.3d 938 (internal cites omitted). 
Furthermore, the court stated that "investigative acts that are not reasonably related to dispelling 
or resolving the articulated grounds for the stop are permissible only if they do not add to the 
delay already lawfully experienced and do not represent any further intrusion on the detainee's 
rights." Id. Moreover, the court stated that there was nothing in the officer's testimony that 
indicated that criminal activity on the part of the passengers. Id The court also cited United 
States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94 (1948), which stated that "where police officers have no 
evidence or information implicating a suspect, mere presence, in the car does not give officers 
probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime." Baker, -1 82 P.3d 939. 
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b, Mr. Hurt's situation is analogous to the Baker decision. 
Mr. Hurt was a passenger in a friend's vehicle when the car was pulled over for speeding 
by Officer Wurtz. After Officer Wurtz pulled over the vehicle, he ran the license of the driver 
and found out that the driver had a warrant out for his arrest. The officer placed the driver under 
arrest, and after placing him in the back seat of his patrol car, the officer first spoke to Mr. Hurt. 
The officer told Mr. Hurt to get out of the car, and then asked if Mr. Hurt had any weapons. Mr. 
Hurt answered the question in the negative and then the officer made Mr. Hurt empty his pockets 
where no weapons or drug paraphernalia was found. 
Shortly after, the officer noticed an eye glass case in Mr. Hurt's pocket. The officer 
made Mr. Hurt open the case. The officer did not get a good enough look, so he made him open 
the case again, and that is when the officer noticed the drug paraphernalia. 
"A seizure occurs if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Brendlin, 127 S.Ct. at 
2405 (quoting United States v. Menednhall 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). In looking at all the 
circumstances of Mr. Hurt's case, the facts suggest that he did not believe he had the right to 
leave. As soon as the arrest was made, the officer immediately approached Mr. Hurt and asked 
him to get out of the car and immediately began questioning him. 
Just as the arrest in Baker ended the purpose of the traffic stop, so did the arrest in Mr. 
Hurt's case. In order for the officer to continue to detain Mr. Hurt, the officer must have a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hurt was involved in criminal activity, and the officer did not 
testify as to any facts that would give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Hurt was 
involved in some sort of criminal activity. Furthermore, in Baker, the court found that there was 
no reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had been committed or was about to be committed 
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when the officer saw a knife on the lap of one of the passengers. Baker, 182 P.3d 940. Mr. 
Hurt's situation there was no knife visible, nor were there any strange acts by Mr. Hurt that 
would cause police to have a reasonable suspicion that there might be criminal activity. 
II. The search by Officer Wurtz violated Mr. Hurt's constitutional rights. 
The United States Supreme Court has established that a weapons frisk may not be 
conducted absent individual suspicion that an individual is both armed and dangerous. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Furthermore, "if a protective search goes beyond what is necessary to 
determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be 
suppressed." Baker, 182 P.3d 940 (quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,113). 
There is a slight difference between this case and Baker. In Baker, the officers testified 
that they did not fear for their life, which would be interpreted that there was no individualized 
suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. However, the passengers in the car in 
Baker had a total of 13 knives which would, undoubtedly, give suspicion that the passengers 
were armed and dangerous. Furthermore, the incident in Baker happened around 1:30 in the 
morning. However, in Mr. Hurt's situation, there are no facts to support an individualized 
suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. 
Mr. Hurt was riding in a car with another man, and when they got pulled over by an 
officer, Mr. Hurt remained in the car and did not do anything suspicious according to the 
officer's testimony. According to Terry, an officer must have a suspicion that an individual is 
armed and dangerous. However, Officer Wurtz did not testify as to any acts that might lead him 
to have a suspicion that Mr. Hurt was armed and dangerous. The officer merely states that he 
could have had a weapon, but if that is all that is required then officers would have the ability to 
search anyone during a traffic stop. _Officer Wurtz ran Mr. Hurt's name through a check and 
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found out that he had not been convicted of any violent crimes. Furthermore, he asked Mr. Hurt 
if he had been convicted of any violent crimes, and he asked Mr. Hurt if he had any weapons on 
him which was answered in the negative. The suspicion must come from more than a hunch; 
there must be some sort of act that affirms the suspicion by the officer. The requirement is that 
officers must be able to articulate specific facts combined with rational inferences therefrom 
which supports the reasonable belief that a person is armed and dangerous. State v. Warren, 
2003 UT 36,1| 29. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully request that his Court reverse the 
trial courts ruling and dismiss the charges. 
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(January 23, 2008). 
THE JUDGE: State of Utah versus Hurt, Russell E. 
Hurt. 
Mr. Hurt is your attorney here today? 
THE DEFENDANT? (Short inaudible, way from mic). 
THE JUDGE: Okay. We'll get him in here. Have a 
seat here at counsel table. Will you see if the public 
defender is (short inaudible, away from mic). 
SPEAKER: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. UNRAU: Good morning, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Good morning. 
MR. UNRAU: Or afternoon I guess. 
THE JUDGE: I made that mistake myself. 
Call the matter of State of Utah versus Russell 
Hurt. Mr. Hurt, be seated at counsel table with your 
attorney. This matter is scheduled for evidentiary hearing 
today on a motion to suppress. Are the parties prepared to 
proceed? 
MS. LAKE: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. UNRAU: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: You may call your first witness. 
MS. LAKE: The state calls Trooper David Wurtz. 
THE JUDGE: Will you raise your mght hand please 





























having been duly placed under oath by the clerk of the court 
and sworn to testify truthfully, upon examination testified 
as follows:. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you, 
DIRECT BY MS. LAKE 
Q. (MS- LAKE:) Will you please state your name and 
occupation? 
A. (THE WITNESS:) David Wurtz, I work with the Utah 
Highway Patrol as a State Trooper. 
THE JUDGE: Spell your last name. 
THE WITNESS: W-U-R-T-Z. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
Q. (MS. LAKE:) And a, Trooper Wurtz, how long have 
you been with the Utah Highway Patrol? 
A. (THE WITNESS:) A little over two years. 
Q. All right. And have you received your training at 
the Peace Officers Standards and Training? 
A. I have. 
Q. And graduated from that academy? 
A. I did. 
Q. All right. I'm going to call your attention to a 
date of August 20th of 2007. Were you on duty that day? 


























Q. And were you in the area of SR-248 around mile 
marker 6? 
A. I was. 
Q. And what were you doing in the area? 
A. I was just on regular patrol at that time. 
Q. All right. 
A. Running speed and making sure people are obeying 
the laws. 
Q. Did you have occasion with make contact with the 
defendant's a, vehicle? 
A. I did. I did. The vehicle was going 87 miles an 
hour in a 65 zone. 
Q. And were you able to get that with a radar or lidar 
(phonetic)— 
A. Radar. 
Q. — verification. Radar? 
All right. And based on that traffic violation 
did you then make a stop on the vehicle? 
A. I did. 
Q. All right. 
THE JUDGE: What kind of car was it? 
THE WITNESS: It was a black Volkswagen Jetta. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
Q. (MS. LAKE:) Approximately what time in the 



























A. (THE WITNESS:) It was about 7:30 in the evening. 
Q. All right. And what was the light conditions like 
at the time? 
A. I believe it was becoming dusk at the time. 
Q. Okay. All right. So you make contact with the 
vehicle. Do you approach on the driver side or passenger 
side? 
A. I approached on the driver side. 
Q. All right. And was there backup support there for 
you? 
A. After I initially made contact with the driver of 
the vehicle a, I made, I did a driver's license check and a 
warrants check. The driver showed that he had a $1,000 
warrant for his arrest. 
At that time Trooper Percy responded to the area 
where I was at. 
Q. And is that typical to have another officer respond 
when you're— 
A. Yes. If they're, if they're available they usually 
will. 
Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned the driver, I believe 
you said Grant Black? 
A. That is— 
Q. What his name? 


























Q. And you indicated he had a warrant. Correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Were you given any other information by dispatch 
concerning this individual? 
A. When I ran his information a, they let me know 
that he has a prior drug history with methamphetamines with 
him and a, the, be careful, that he may have drugs with 
him. 
Q. Okay. All right. So what happens next? 
A. After Trooper Percy was there I asked Grant to 
step out of the vehicle. I took him into custody for the 
warrant service. He was searched and placed in my 
vehicle. 
I then returned to the vehicle on the driver side 
and was talking to Mr. Hurt. Asked him to step out of the 
vehicle so we could do a... 
Before I did that I asked a, Mr. Grant if he was 
willing to let a, Mr. Hurt have the, drive the vehicle from 
here so it wouldn't be towed. He said that was fine. 
I returned, asked Mr. Hurt. He said... I asked 
him for his driver's license, he gave me a driver's license. 
I ran the driver's license it came back to me that it was 
suspended and that he did not have any warrants. I 
returned to Grant and said he can't drive the vehicle, 



























his sister from Kamas and she was coming to pick up the 
vehicle. 
I then talked to Mr. Hurt some more. Asked him 
to step out of the vehicle so that we could do a search 
incident to arrest on the vehicle. Mr. Hurt stepped out 
and was standing on the passenger side of the vehicle. Asked 
him if he had any weapons in any pocket and if he could pull 
his pockets out so I could make sure he did not have any 
weapons. 
Q. What was his response to that question? 
A. He, he asked, he said he didn't have any weapons. 
He pulled his front pockets out. I did not see any 
weapons at that time. Had him turn around. He, I didn't 
see any— 
Q. Now, when you had him turn around did you— 
A. So I could check his back pockets, make sure there 
weren't anything, a visual sight of any impressions in a back 
pocket. 
Q. And did you ask him or did you tell him? 
A. I asked him to turn around. After he did that I 
noticed an eyeglass container in one of the cargo pocket 
pants. 




























THE JUDGE: I'm sorry. Did you see anything in 
the back pockets? 
THE WITNESS: No, I did not. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
A. (THE WITNESS:) I, I a, it was an eyeglass 
container, a nicer one that flips open, it's a harder case. 
I asked him to pull that out of his pocket because it's big 
enough to fit a weapon in, and for officer safety issue I 
didn't want a knife to be in there or a little small weapon 
in there that could harm us while we had our back turned to 
search the vehicle. 
THE JUDGE: Would you make a record of the size 
(short inaudible, away from mic). 
MS. LAKE: Can you indicate a— 
THE WITNESS: Can I show wrth my hands? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. I thought you had. 
THE WITNESS: Oh. 
THE JUDGE: I wasn't watching. Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: It's about, it's a, just a normal 
eyeglass container about this big, it's about that wide, that 
thick. 
THE JUDGE: So for the record about two inches 
thick and about six inches long? 
THE WITNESS: Maybe about, I'd say closer to an 



























six inches long. About maybe three inches wide. 
THE JUDGE: And this was a hard case? 
THE WITNESS: It was a hard case. 
Q. (MS. LAKE:) Now officer, if you could a, I'm just 
going to ask you to stand. 
A. (THE WITNESS:) Okay. 
Q. Describe the type of pants that the defendant had 
on. 
A. They were like a painter pants. They have the 
little side pockets. And the, where I saw the eyeglass 
container was on the lower pocket and it had, the eyeglass 
container was sticking out the top of that pocket so it was 
visible. 
Q. Could you see a bulge in the pocket as well? 
A. I could. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Where the eyeglass container was. 
Q. All right. 
A. I then asked him if. he could take that out and open 
it, make sure there was no weapons in there. 
Q. What was his response to that request? 
A. He then a, pulled it out, opened it up really quick 
and closed it before I could see in there. 
Q. Can you a, demonstrate again for the judge how the 


























A. May I stand up? 
Q. Yes. 
A. He was standing up. He was on the, it would be 
the front right corner of the car. I was around the fender 
area on the driver side of the vehicle. He opened it up 
and closed it really quick to kind of hide something in 
there. I told him I could not see in there, I didn't know 
if there was a weapon in there. Asked him if he could reopen 
it. He then reopened it and showed me the contents in it. 
I recognized a needle, a spoon and a, some plastic baggies. 
He then reclosed it and threw it on the hood of the 
vehicle. 
Q. And based on your observation of this hard a, 
eyeglass holder, is it possible that that holder could 
contain a knife? 
A. It is very possible. It's also, they make guns 
small enough that they could fit guns as well in there. 
Q. During the time when you were asking the 
defendant a, to empty his pockets did you ever a, assert 
any claim of authority, or tell him that he had to do this? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you ever exhibit any type of force, in other 
words, drawing a weapon, drawing a baton? 
A. No. 



























Did the defendant seem fairly cooperative when you 
were making these requests to him? 
A. He did. He didn't complain at all. And he, I 
didn't tell him he had to do anything, I just asked him 
questions and he did the things that I asked. 
Q. So he never refused to do— 
A. No, he did not refuse. 
Q. — to do any of your requests? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, I want you to describe for the court what 
technique you use when you are searching a vehicle. 
A. When we search a vehicle our backs are, if there 
are multiple people our backs are usually towards the 
people, we have to pop our head up. So there is a big 
officer safety issue there whenever we seaxclr a vehicle. 
Sometimes when we have multiple people we can have someone 
watch. But due to the circumstances I already had one 
person in custody. We wanted to kind of get through the 
vehicle really quick, make sure we were okay. 
Q. And is it typical a, when you have two troopers 
available that both will effectuate the search on the 
vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was that your intent on this occasion? 
A. Yes. 
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